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SOME TRENDS IN THE LAW OF ARREST*
Roy MORELAND**

One of the encouraging things about the law is the fact that
it does move-although often too slowly-in attempting to adjust
itself to the needs of a changing society. The criminal law, in
particular, has made tremendous strides in the past fifty years,
especially in the substantive field. Previously, little progress had
been made in three or four hundred years. And now, especial and
marked improvement is to be hoped for in the new Model Penal
Code on the substantive criminal law being prepared under the
auspices of the American Law Institute.1 It should be emphasized
that this project of the Institute, unlike practically all of the others,
is to be, not a restatement, but a model criminal code framed to fit
the times.
When the usual speaker or writer discusses the Law of Arrest,
he rehearses the procedural or adjective phase of the subject. This
is quite natural since that is where the great majority of the practical problems lie and where improvement needs most to be made.
But, since this is true, one is apt to overlook evolving principles or
needed changes on the substantive side. Encouragingly, instances
where improvements have already been made, or are in the process
of being made, may be found there too. A few instances of these will
be mentioned before the discussion turns to the procedural phase of
the law of arrest.
One of the substantive rules having to do with the law of arrest
has been so much criticised and so nearly repudiated that it may
be said to be already out of the law for all practical purposes. This
is the historic rule that if one kills an officer while resisting arrest,
it is murder. Sometimes, the old rule has been justified as necessary
to maintain the "justice of the realm" ;2 sometimes, it is stated that
*A substantial portion of the materials in this paper was used by the
author as a member of the panel which discussed "The Law of Arrest" at
the Round Table on Torts and Criminal Law at the 1954 meeting of the
Association of American Law Schools held in New York City in December,
1954. A part of these materials will appear in a forthcoming book.
**A.B., Transylvania College; LL.B., University of Kentucky College
of Law; J.D., University of Chicago Law School; S.J.D., Harvard Law
School. Professor of Law, University of Kentucky Law School, since 1926.
1. Tent. Draft No. 1 of this new project of the American Law Institute
is dated May 1, 1953. A second Tent Draft is dated May 3, 1954. Broadly
speaking, General Principles of Liability, Property Crimes, and Sentencing
and Probation are the only topics covered in these two tentative drafts. The
Reporters are Herbert Wechsler, Chief Reporter, and Morris Ploscowe,
Louis Schwartz, and Paul Tappan, Associate Reporters.
2. See Yong's Case, 4 Co. Rep. 40a, 76 Eng. Rep. 984 (1587) ; Mackaley's Case, Cro. Jac. 279, 79 Eng. Rep. 239 (1611).
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it is necessary to protect arresting officers in the exercise of their
duties. 3 But, while modern decisions often assert the doctrine, a
study of the cases reveals that the defendant would be guilty of
4
murder on another ground, such as the use of a dangerous weapon.
At any rate, resistance to lawful arrest was only a misdemeanor at
common law and it is generaly placed in the same category under
modem penal codes, so the offense, at most, should be no more
than manslaughter. 5 And, to take one further step, since the misdemeanor-manslaughter rule has broken down, except where the
misdemeanor is dangerous in itself, the rule, as baldly stated, should
be outlawed. Otherwise, a defendant may be convicted for the
resistance to arrest rather than for the killing. 6 Livingston Hall administered the coup de grace to the old rule, let us hope, when, in
his article in the Harvard Law Review on "Fifty Years of the Substantive Law of Crimes," he said:
"The ancient doctrine that a murder conviction could be founded upon a death . . .occasioned by resistance to lawful arrest

is being limited. [The doctrine], supported for centuries on
dicta, is at last recognized as nonexistent. 'Constructive crime'
is no longer favored." 7
A second decided improvement in the substantive law of arrest
is now going on as to the ancient rule that an officer may do all that
is reasonably necessary to effectuate the arrest and thus prevent the
escape of a felon-even to the taking of his life." The rule was
largely grounded, originally, on the reasoning that the felon's life
was already forfeited by the felony which he had committed, since
all felonies were punishable by death in the early days.5 The rationalization today is more difficult. Fundamentally, it is based
upon the belief that such a person should not escape trial for. his
crime. Furthermore, there is the additional factor that in many
of these cases the arrestee, a felon, would be dangerous to the
community if he were allowed to escape into it. And finally, the
rule is based partly on the reasoning that an officer is expected to
3. Foster, Crown Law 308 (2d ed. 1791); see State v. M'Mullen,
[1925] 2 Ir. R. 9, 21.
4. See Dickey, Culpable Homicide in Resisting Arrest, 18 Cornell L. Q.
373, 376 (1933).
5. See id. at 388.
6. This is analogous to hanging a man for the felony rather than for
the killing under the felony murder rule. See Moreland, The Law of
Homicide 50 (1952) ; Ellegaard, A Reconsideration of the Felony Murder
Doctrine in New York, 10 St. John's L. Rev. 253, 260-262 (1936); Note, 36
Ky. L. J. 106 (1947).
7. Hall, The Substantive Law of Crines-1887-1936,50 Harv. L. Rev.
616, 642 (1937).
8. See 3 Greenleaf, Evidence, Part V, Homicide, § 115 (15th ed. 1892).
9. See Petrie v. Cartwright, 114 Ky. 103, 109, 70 S.W. 297, 299 (1902).
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accomplish his lawful mission of arrest, and this he should be permitted to do where the arrestee is a felon, even though it necessitates the taking of the felon's life.
At any rate, the rule has been as stated. However, although the
rule still stands as to major, atrocious felonies, 0 an increasing
opposition has arisen to it where the felony is but a minor, nonatrocious one. A mountain boy is discovered carrying a jar of
moonshine whiskey, a statutory felony. The officer attempts to
make an arrest but the lad flees toward a nearby forest. He is
about to get away, so the officer shoots him in the back to prevent
his escape. Such an act on the part of the officer should not be
excusable, and there is a trend in that direction. The statutory
offense, although a felony, is but a minor one. It is non-violent, nonatrocious, and not too serious socially. Certainly its seriousness is
not comparable to the value of the boy's life, thus taken suddenly,
without trial. If tried and convicted, the statutory punishment
would have been far less than death. The officer, as judge and jury,
has inflicted a punishment far, far in excess of that provided by law.
Furthermore, and this is also important, the boy could probably
have been found in his bed that same night and the arrest peaceably consummated. But, even if he had fled the jurisdiction, it is better
that he should have escaped than that his life should have been
taken for such an offense.
Fortunately, the American Law Institute Restatement of Torts
has taken the view that neither an officer nor a private person, with
or without a warrant, is privileged to use deadly force merely to
stop the flight of one whose arrest is sought for the commission
of a non-dangerous felony.-" Rollin Perkins, pointing out that case
authority does not support this position as far as it concerns peace
officers,' 2 is of the opinion that the prestige of the Restatement of
10. See the discussion, Moreland, The Use of Force in Effecting or
Resisting Arrest, 33 Neb. L. Rev. 408-412 (1954).
11. Restatement, Torts § 131 (1934). Note especially, illustration 1.
12. Fortunately, there is positive case authority for the Restatement
rule as to private persons. For example, in the following case, which involved
the theft of a hog, a statutory felony, the court said:
"It must be, however, that the powers of arresting, and the means used
must be enlarged or modified by the character of the felony. The importance to society of having felons arrested in cases of capital feloniessuch as murder and rape-must be much greater than in cases of inferior
felonies, such as larceny.... Extreme measures, therefore, which might
be resorted to in capital felonies, would shock us if resorted to in
inferior felonies." State v. Bryant, 65 N. C. 327, 328 (1871).
See also Storey v. State, 71 Ala. 329, 341 (1882) ; Commonwealth v. Emmons, 157 Pa. Super. 495, 43 A. 2d 568 (1945), commented upon in the Annual
Survey of American Law 1148-1149 (1945).
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Torts will do much to further its acceptance on the criminal side."
Perhaps the most persuasive and most vigorous argument for the
proposed modification of the rule was made by Professor Mikell in
a debate at the annual meeting of the Council of the American Law
Institute in 1931 on a proposed provision in the Model Code of
Criminal Procedure to limit an officer's right to kill to effect an
arrest to cases where ". . . the offense for which the arrest is being
made or attempted is treason, murder, voluntary manslaughter,
mayhem, arson, robbery, common law rape, kidnapping, burglary,
or an assult with intent to murder, rape, or rob. 1" Professor Mikell
argued, in part, as follows:
"It has been said, 'Why should not this man be shot down,
the man who is running away with an automobile? Why not
kill him if you cannot arrest him?' We answer: because, assuming that the man is making no resistance to the officer, he does
not deserve death. If we catch him ... what do we do to him?
Put him before a policeman and have a policeman shoot him?
Of course not. We give him three years in the penitentiary....
Is it for fleeing that we kill him? Fleeing from arrest is also a
common law offense and is punishable by a light penalty, a
penalty much less than for stealing the automobile. If we are not
killing him for stealing the automobile and not killing him for
fleeing, what are we killing him for ?"',
However, the proposed provision encountered so much opposition that it does not appear in the Official Draft of the Model Code
of Criminal Procedure.
Nevertheless, it may be concluded that there is considerable
secondary authority and occasional vigorous dicta1 6 in decisions that
an officer cannot kill to prevent the escape of one who has committed a minor felony, non-violent in character, the Restatement of
Torts supports that view, and the trend seems to be in that direction.
The two trends in the substantive law of arrest which have been
discussed favor the defendant; the one to be mentioned now presents the other side of the shield in that it favors the prosecution.
One of the most interesting jurisprudential propositions in the
criminal law is that of provocation which reduces or mitigates an
intentional unlawful killing from imurder to voluntary manslaughter.
In such cases the law might well, since the homicide is neither
13. Perkins, The Law of Arrest, 25 Iowa L. Rev. 201, 275-276 (1940).
14. See 9 Proceedings A. L. I. 179 (1931). See also Warner, Modern
Trends in American Law of Arrest, 21 Can. B. Rev. 191, 206 (1943).

15. 9 Proceedings A. L. I. 187-188 (1943).

16. See United States v. Clark, 71 Fed. 710, 713 (1887); Reneau v.
State, 2 Lea 720, 721 (Tenn. 1879). And see Bohlen and Schulman, Arrest
With and Without Warrant, 75 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 485, 494-504 (1927);
Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant, 22 Mich. L. Rev. 798, 812 (1924).
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justifiable nor excusable, hold the defendant guilty of murder; it
might, on the other hand, since he acted in hot blood under compelling circumstances, excuse him; it does neither-in effect it compromises with him and holds him guilty of a middle offense1 7

voluntary manslaughter.

One of the provocations, which will reduce an intentional unlawful killing from murder to voluntary manslaughter is an illegal
arrest. Should this provocation operate automatically in favor of the
defendant? In other words, in a case where the defendant has no
heat of passion in fact should he, nevertheless, be guilty of voluntary
manslaughter, if the arrest is illegal and the unlawful killing intentional? A minority group of states hold that the rule of reduction
operates automatically,'8 in the absence of "express malice."' 19
jurisdictions which follow this rule base their reasoning fundamentally, not upon the doctrine of provocation, but upon a social
policy of protecting the liberty of the individual citizen against the
unlawful enforcement of the law. One must not make light of such
reasoning-it is important to preserve the liberty of the citizen and
to encourage the love of freedom in every heart. And the unlawful
encroachment upon individual liberty should be resisted no matter
from what source it comes. On the other hand, even the most ardent
lover of individual liberty would find it difficult to maintain that
one should kill an officer to prevent an illegal arrest. But suppose
the arrestee does kill the officer under such circumstances? The law
may well, under ordinary principles of provocation, reduce the
offense to voluntary manslaughter, if the defendant acted under heat
of passion caused by the illegal arrest. But, if the rule operates
automatically, it will result in many cases in reducing the offense
20
for defendants who did not even know that the arrest was illegal,
and so in fact had no legal heat of passion. For example, the arrest
17. See the discussion, Moreland, The Law of Homicide 67 (1952).
18. Commonwealth v. Carey, 66 Mass. (12 Cush.) 246 (1853) ; Commonwealth v. Drew, 4 Mass. 391 (1808); Jones v. State, 170 Miss. 581,
155 So. 430 (1934); Dickey, supra note 4, at 379-382. For cases holding
that the rule does not operate automatically in the case of express malice,
see Rafferty v. People, 72 Ill. 37 (1837); State v. Holcomb, 86 Mo. 371
(1885).
19. The term "express malice" is an unhappy one in this connection.

This is because the use of the word "express" is redundant. Malice (intent)

alone is sufficient to support a conviction of murder under commonly accepted

principles. But the cases use the phrase, "express malice." About all that can
be said is that in the cases which have applied the "express malice" rule, the
party who committed the unlawful killing has made it clear that he was not
acting from a passion provoked by the illegalify of the arrest. See the discussion, Dickey, supra note 4, at 381.
20. For an illustration, see Regina v. Tooley, 2 Ld. Raym. 1296, 92
Eng. Rep. 349 (1709). "They saw a woman, for aught appears, a perfect
stranger to them, led to the roundhouse under a charge of a criminal nature.
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may have been illegal because of some technical defect unknown to
the defendant. That means that so far as his knowledge went the
arrest was legal. In such a case the real incentive for the killing
was something other than the illegality of the arrest. To permit
a defendant to seize upon the rule of reduction under the guise of
protecting individual freedom under such circumstances is not a
wise public policy, it is believed. Moreover, it is at variance with
the usual rule of reduction which does not operate automatically but
only if there is heat of passion in fact. And the trend seems to be
toward the view that the reduction does not operate automatically,
and it is already the rule in the majority of states.2 '
Let us turn now to some trends on the procedural side of The
Law of Arrest. It is here that one finds most of the criticism of the
law and of its administration. Criticism runs in two more or less
divergent directions: (1) The police do not enforce the law adequately, (2) The police continually, repeatedly and flagrantly disregard the constitutional rights of those who come under their
jurisdiction.
This divergence leads one at the very outset of any discussion
of criminal procedure to face that fact of life, so well pointed out
by Jerome Hall,22 that in this field there is bound to be a continual
conflict between the great desire of the public for security and protection from those who commit crime on the one hand and the
strong political and social insistence on the personal liberty of the
individual and protection from physical and/or mental pressures
by those who enforce the criminal law on the other. Necessarily,
there must be a continual compromise between these two public
desires, which leads one naturally and logically to the conclusion
that, all factors considered, ". . . the ideal police force [is] the one
which affords a maximum of protection at the cost of a minimum
of interference with the lawful liberty of the subject.' '23
This upon evidence at the Old Bailey, a month or two afterwards, cometh
out to be an illegal arrest and imprisonment, a violation of inagna charta;
and these ruffians are presumed to have been seized, all of a sudden, with a
strong zeal for magna chartaand the laws, and in this frenzy to have drawn
upon the constable and stabbed his assistant. It is extremely difficult to conceive, that the violation of magna charta, a fact of which they were totally
ignorant at that time, could be the provocation that led them to this outrage."
Foster, Crown Law 316 (2d ed. 1:791).
21. Sanders v. State, 181 Ala. 35, 61 So. 336 (1913) ; People v. Bissett,
246 Ill. 516, 92 N. E. 949 (1910) ; Territory v. Lynch, 18 N. M. 15, 133 Pac.
405 (1913) ; Galvin v. State, 46 Tenn. 283 (6 Cold. 1869) ; Miller v. State,
31 Tex. Ctim. 609, 21 S. W. 925 (1893). See the excellent article, Dickey,
supra note 4, at 379-387.
22. Hall, The Law of Arrest in Relation to Contemporary Social
Problems, 3 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 3.5 (1936).

23. W. L. Melville Lee, A History of Police in England xii (1901).
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The procedural trends to be discussed in this paper will have
to do with only the second common criticism of the police-that
they repeatedly and flagrantly disregard the constitutional rights
of those who come under their jurisdiction. There are many
phases of this unlawful enforcement of the law by the police. The
one to be discussed first is one of their worst offenses-physical
and/or mental pressures exerted on those in their custody in order
to obtain confessions or information. Such cases fall broadly under
the well known heading, "The Third Degree."
One does not have to make out a case to show the use of the
Third Degree by the police. The papers are full of instances of
it. Repeatedly, cases involving it get into the courts, sometimes
going all the way to the Supreme Court of the United States.
Periodically, individual police officers, here and there, admit its
use, justifying it on the ground that it is necessary to get evidence.
One of the strongest indictments of the practice on a high level,
indicating its wide use throughout the country, is found in the
Report of the Wickersham Commission which, after a thorough
investigation, concluded:
"After reviewing the evidence obtainable the authors of this
report reach the conclusion that the third degree-that is the use
of physical brutality, or other forms of cruelty, to obtain involuntary confessions or admissions-is widespread. Protracted
questioning of prisoners is commonly employed. Threats and
methods of intimidation, adjusted to the age or mentality of the
victim, are frequently used, either by themselves or in combination with some of the other practices mentioned. Physical
brutality, illegal detention, and2 refusal
to allow access of coun4
sel to the prisoner is common.

That was in 1931. Conditions are little better today, it is believed.
Most alarming, is the fact that it is becoming standard procedure
in many cities. As stated by Sam Bass Warner, "Everywhere the
formula for successful detective work is that laid down by former
Captain Fiaschetti of the New York City police: 'You get a bit of
information, and then you grab the suspect and break him down.
That is how detective work is done-a general formula.' "25 Several
months ago an attorney whose name is well-known all over Kentucky made a public address. He was recounting his experiences
in his first criminal case as a young lawyer. His client was a Negro
and the prosecution had a full confession. The Negro told him
24. 4 Nat. Comm. on Law Obs. and Enf., Rep. on Lawlessness in Law
Enforcement 4 (1931).
25. Warner, How Can the Third Degree Be Eliminated, 1 Bill of
Rights Rev. 24, 25 (1940).
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that it had been beat out of him, but how could the lawyer prove it?
It happened that the lawyer recounted his problem to a young newspaper man-who it happens has since become a national figure.
The young reporter flush with friendship-and several drinkstold the attorney that he had witnessed the beating of the Negro
and the obtaining of the confession. According to the reporter the
Negro had been brought into a room with a policeman holding
each arm. A third policeman asked the Negro for a confession. The
man remained mute. The policeman hit him with his fist. Then
again the question and, then again, a blow. This went on until the
Negro was upon his knees and had consented to sign a confession.
Also present in the room, as the fourth policeman, was a sergeant,
a man who later obtained high position in police circles and in
politics-a man of high reputation for integrity in the communitythe type of person who would not be expected to countenance such
proceedings.
The following day the young lawyer went to the reporter and
asked him if he would testify to the beating when the case came to
trial and the confession was introduced in evidence. The reporter
refused-he was a newspaper man and this would be a violation of
confidence--and besides he would then be at outs with the police
and never be able to get atother story from them. But another
young reporter who saw the beating did testify at the trial-he
had obtained another job, was leaving town, and so was free to
testify! The first reporter was also subpoenaed to corroborate the
testimony and when asked at the trial whether he had seen the
alleged beating simply replied, "I was looking out of the window
at the time." The reporter had kept faith but the jury had heard
enough and they set aside the confession !
This historiette is recited for several purposes. First, the third
degree is not limited to Chicago and other large cities-it happens
in many places. Second, it is often practiced by authority of, or at
least under the condonation of, police officials who are otherwise
practically above reproach. Third, if this Negro or anyone else
who has suffered the third degree (whether guilty or innocent)
wishes to prosecute an action, he will find himself without relief. He
has no witnesses. Furthermore, the officer is practically always
personally execution proof and his bonding company will insist that
26
he acted outside his authority in resorting to duress.
26. State, to Use of Brooks v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md., 147 Md.
194, 127 At. 758 (1925). See also Kauper, Judicial Examination of the
Accused-A Remedy for the Third Degree, 30 Mich. L. Rev. 1224, 1225
(1932).
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There are those who consider that it will remain impossible to
stop the practice2" so long as there remains a need for the police to
question suspects in order to get confessions or information. To
satisfy this need for questioning by the police by providing for it
elsewhere and by others than the police, there has developed a trend
toward allowing the judicial officer who holds the preliminary
examination to question-at length if desired-at that time. It is
the argument of Sam Bass Warner, one of the leading advocates of
this procedure, that it will do away with most of the need for questioning by the police2- and that, consequently, such questioning by
them will then come to an end. If it persisted on occasion, then,
there being no longer a public policy or interest to be served by
leniency toward such unlawful conduct by the police, they could be,
and probably would be, vigorously prosecuted and convicted.
The writer does not believe this, since it is practically impossible
to obtain prosecution and/or convictions of the police for any acts
arising out of and in the course of duty, and so he does not believe
such a procedure would stop police questioning. But the primary
objection to such a procedure is of a more fundamental nature.
Such a procedure, being inquisitorial, would be in direct conflict
with the American accusatorial form of criminal procedure. And,
while it is true that the examination would be in public, the preparation of the accused for the public appearance might well be made in
private. The Russians have shown how efficient private grooming
for a public hearing can be. It is concluded, then, that the introduction of this inquisitorial procedure would not achieve its purpose
and, more importantly, would lead to evils more serious than the
one it would attempt to prevent.29 Indeed, it would be in violation
of the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination." °
27. At the Round Table where this paper was presented, along with four

others, it was stated two or three times in the discussion that the third de-

gree is seldom used today. It is the writer's opinion from his reading of
the newspapers, professional materials, and a number of contacts with professional law enforcement officers that it is true that extreme physical
brutality as a part of third degree procedure is now unusual. On the other

hand, it is believed from the evidence at hand that the infliction of mental

suffering by such practices as long, persistent questioning under strong lights
by changing shifts of police officers with the denial of sufficient sleep is on
the increase. It is now becoming standard practice for the police to question
suspects at length. What is the reader's opinion as to the use of the third

degree today?

28. See Warner, .supranote 25.
29. See Miller, Lawyers and the Administration of Criminal Justice,
20 A. B. A. J. 77, 78 (1934).
30. Orfield, Criminal Procedure from Arrest to Appeal 68 (1947).
It has been suggested that the constitutional issue could be evaded by having

the magistrate warn the accused that he did not have to answer the questions,
if he did not wish to do so. Would it be constitutional to provide that in case
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The second procedural trend to be discussed may not be a trend
at all but only wishful thinking. At any rate, if it is not a trend it
should be-an increasing tendency to question the reason for, and
the wisdom of, the rude and hostile manner which the police so
often use toward those other members of society with whom they
come in contact.
What the writer has in mind, fundamentally, is that the police
have bad public relations which should be improved, if possible.
Almost every citizen has come in contact with some example of
the over-bearing attitude which the police manifest so often in the
ordinary administration of their work. A simple example, encountered periodically by many people, is the case of the motorcycle cop who pulls up along-side the motorist and sarcastically inquires: "Hey, Bub, where's the fire?" This sort of opening remark
naturally raises a certain amount of heat in the motorist. Surely,
it does not take much wisdom to know that the public should be
dealt with in a professional manner by the police, a criterion which
does not include sarcasm or brow-beating.
Of course, the example given raises the problem in a minor
situation. Those who travel the road frequently have had a number
of experiences involving greater rudeness and creating a higher
degree of heat. About fifteen years ago a motorist was returning to
Kentucky from the east with his wife and baby son. Suddenly, a
police car forced them over to the curb. Surprised and incensed, for
the rate of speed had been very moderate, an inquiry was made as
to the occasion for the interruption. Without replying to the question the State Policeman ordered the driver out of the car and told
him to open the rear compartment. When questioned as to the reason for the demand the officer became menacing. When the compartment was opened, a demand was made that several suitcases
therein be opened. This was done and the officer turned the contents of the luggage out on the ground. He made no attempt to
keep from disarranging the materials; he threw them out in confused heaps. Not finding any'zhing, he ordered the driver to put the
contents back in the suitcases and to drive on. Questioned again
as to the reason for the search no reply whatever was given. There
is no excuse for such conduct. What was the officer searching for?
of a refusal to answer, after such admonition, this might be called to the
attention of the jury? The writer is of the opinion that this would be an
evasion of the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. See A. L. I.
Code of Crim. Proc. Dr. No. 1, 27 (1928) ; 3 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 658-661 (8th ed. 1927). For a contra view, see Kauper, supra note 26,
at 1239.
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Was he looking for diseased fruit? Smuggled goods? Had someone
robbed a bank? Or was he simply taking advantage of an out-of3
state motorist who could not even answer back? .
These are traffic cases and it is in traffic situations that most
contacts of the public with the police occur. The automobile has
caused many ordinary citizens, who might otherwise not have active
contact with the police in a long lifetime, to become subject to the
abuse and invective which they so often exercise over the defenseless individuals who come within their jurisdiction. Previously,
little attention was paid to abuse by the police-it was inflicted on a
segment of society that did not count anyway-"poor white and
poor black trash." But when the ordinary citizen is subjected to it
a couple of times in the course of traffic violations, he becomes
articulate. It is such people who are beginning to wonder whether
better treatment should not be demanded from the police.
It is desired to turn now from the traffic cases to situations
which point up far more serious abuse by the police and lead inevitably to distrust and hatred on the part of those who have received such treatment. The following extract from the autobiography of one who spent his early life as a young ruffian will
illustrate this category:
"The cops kept on our tails 24 hours a day, always looking
to get one of us alone in a dark place so they could beat us with
their night sticks. They tried to break our legs, so we couldn't
run for a while or-even better-end up crippled. Every time
the cops nabbed us, they tried to sucker us into running so they
would have an excuse to fire at us, but we never fell for this
trick....
"My own personal enemy was Casey the Cop. He caught me
in a hallway, after I had clipped a bag of coal. I remember laying
in this dark corner, my legs battered and without any feeling,
my teeth scraping against the tile of the floor, blood coming out
of my mouth, blood running down my forehead, and Casey the
Cop standing over me, laughing, and saying, 'You dirty, thievin'
little Guinea greaseball. Maybe now you'll think twice before
you steal on my beat again.' ,132
That was Rocky Graziano who was speaking. And, it must be
admitted that Rocky was a pretty tough kid. But, such treatment
31. This incident, while rather extreme, has its parallels. The author
is in possession of the accounts of others, just as outrageous. Motorists who
travel the roads a great deal know of similar incidents, which, while they
differ as to their facts, show an equal degree of rudeness. Many traffic policemen and constables are uniformly courteous, others are not, or are not on
occasion. The out-of-county or out-of-state motorist is the one most likely
to experience such conduct.
32. Look, Nov. 30, 1954, p. 30, cols. 1-2.
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on the part of the police is not only unlawful 3 m-it defeats its own
purpose. It breeds hatred. It puts the law on one side and the kids on
the other. Such police-hating kids grow into adults who despise the
law - and fight it all their lives.
Admittedly, there is much to be said on the other side. Many of
those with whom the police deal are armed and hard to handle. That
is part of the problem; the law should deal more severely with those
who carry firearms without valid reason! But many of those with
whom the police deal are not criminals, they are ordinary citizens
or boys. The trouble is that the police have a set pattern of being
tough and rude and over-bearing. There are, of course, exceptions,
but they simply point up the pattern.
Of course, the problem is not an easy one. Naturally, it is hard to
create an atmosphere of sweetness and light while warning an individual that he is breaking the law or while making an arrest. But
others than the police have similar tasks and do a better jobjudges, teachers, those who employ labor. The point is that while
the problem is not an easy one, it can be handled better than the
police, as a profession, are handling it now. It is handled much
better in England.
What are some constructive measures to improve the situation?
The first suggestion that is always made when this subject is discussed is to improve the caliber of those persons who serve as police.
This immediately leads to the second suggestion, which is, "The
Police Should Be Better Paid." There is merit in both suggestions,
it is hardly debatable that the police are poorly paid considering the
responsibility of the position they occupy. Of course, the modern
solution to all problems is to collect and spend more tax money! In
this case, it is believed very justifiable.
But the problem is deeper than personnel. There is something
wrong with the fundamental attitude of the police toward the public
and, partly as a consequence, in the attitude of the public toward the
police. The defect is a professional one. After all, the police, al33. "From the viewpoint of efficiency, police lawlessness is the worst
possible practice. It builds the wall between police and public higher than
ever. It stops channels of information and blocks the sources of evidence.
Realization that the police are a mere handful, impotent to control by sheer
physical force, as is demonstrated when rioting breaks out in a large city,
makes it evident that the usurpation by the police of judicial or executive
functions comes at a high price in a civilized community. If the police are
educated to understand the rules of law which define their particular job,
and if they function impartially within the limits of those laws, they will
preserve democratic procedures and win the public support that is essential
to police efficiency." Hall, Police and Law in a Democratic Socicty, 28 Ind.

L. J. 133, 156 (1953).
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though occupying an official position, are people and citizens too,
trying to do a job, just as those in other professions. They should
not be swept away with the authority temporarily handed to them,
they are not on one side and the public on the other. Other citizens
have potential points of conflict with the public too; they resolve
them without unreasonable heat and friction; otherwise they lose
their jobs. The same should be true of the police.
It is believed that the problem should be recognized and
remedied by the police themselves. Zechariah Chafee voiced this
thought when he said in discussing remedies for the unlawful enforcement of the law by the police: "The best solution must come
from within the police department itself. ' 34 It would be well if
individual police departments would develop an esprit de corps
based upon courtesy and efficient firmness rather than upon rudeness and brutality. But it is increasingly apparent that such a
change will not come about without pressure from without. Let us
hope, then, that there is a trend on the part of the public toward
applying that pressure by way of demanding more considerate and
humane treatment at the hands of the police who are, after all,
professional employees, not the masters, of the people.
Lest this language sound unfriendly, let us hasten to say that
such is not its design. It is intended rather to focus attention upon
an unfortunate condition that exists in the administration of the
criminal law in the hope that something will be done about it. And
there are many things that can be done to improve the public relations of the police. For example, Halloween was always a time of
deep conflict between the police and a certain segment of the public
in Lexington, Kentucky. Repeatedly, the tension and hostility between the two groups culminated in the use of night sticks and arrests. Always there was more than a considerable destruction of
property. But, beginning around 1950, the police have run a Police
Festival on Halloween Night, which has completely cleared up the
situation. They use hill-billy music, boxing, tumbling, and other
free exhibition acts and distribute donated candies and such. The
program has been a tremendous success from the beginning. Now
in its fourth year it has grown to such an extent that thousands of
youngsters attend and it has become necessary to run it simultaneously in two sections in opposite ends of the city. When the event
is over, around 11:00 p.m., the youngsters go home. Believe it or
not, destruction and rowdyism have practically ceased. For one
34. Chafee, Remedies for the Third Degree, 148 At. 'Monthly 621,
629 (1931).
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night the police are on the side of the kids. And likewise, the kids
are on the side of the police! Similar remarkable success has been
achieved in Lexington with local police administration of the
Golden Gloves boxing eliminations. Such instances are but a start
in a program which would make the police, like other citizens, a part
of an interlocking, co-operative society.3 5
35. The author has felt for years that the public relations of the police
should be improved. He wondered why others did not have the same idea but
found practically nothing in the periodicals on the subject. Inquiries have
developed the fact, however, that a number of individual police departments
have been working quietly on the problem. State police, particularly, are
giving attention to this phase of their professional relationship with the
public. Recently there was handed to the author by a state policeman a small
pamphlet, written by a policeman for police, which handles the problem in a
very persuasive way. This booklet, Rocks in the Roadway, written by Dan
Hollingsworth, contains a Foreward by Franklin Kreml, Director, The
Traffic Institute, Northwestern University and The Traffic Division, International Association of Chiefs of Police.

